Modern applications significantly enhance user experience by adapting to each user's individual condition and/or preferences. While this adaptation can greatly improve a user's experience or be essential for the application to work, the exposure of user data to the application presents a significant privacy threat to the users-even when the traces are anonymized (since the statistical matching of an anonymized trace to prior user behavior can identify a user and their habits). Because of the current and growing algorithmic and computational capabilities of adversaries, provable privacy guarantees as a function of the degree of anonymization and obfuscation of the traces are necessary. Our previous work has established the requirements on anonymization and obfuscation in the case that data traces are independent between users. However, the data traces of different users will be dependent in many applications, and an adversary can potentially exploit such. In this paper, we consider the impact of correlation between user traces on their privacy. First, we demonstrate that the adversary can readily identify the association graph, revealing which user data traces are correlated. Next, we demonstrate that the adversary can use this association graph to break user privacy with significantly shorter traces than in the case of independent users, and that obfuscating data traces independently across users is often insufficient to remedy such leakage. Finally, we discuss how users can employ data trace dependency to improve privacy by performing better obfuscation. N. Takbiri is with the
I. INTRODUCTION
Many modern applications exploit users' characteristics to provide an enhanced user experience, including their past choices and present states. In particular, emerging Internet of Things (IoT) applications include smart homes, health care, and connected vehicles that intelligently tailor their performances to their users. For instance, a typical connected vehicle application optimizes its route selection based on the current location of the vehicle, traffic conditions, and the users' preferences. For such applications to be able to provide their enhanced, user-tailored performances, they need to request their clients for potentially sensitive user information such as mobility behaviors and social preferences. Therefore, such applications trade off user privacy for enhanced utility. Previous work [2] shows that even if users' data traces are anonymized before being provided to such applications, standard statistical matching techniques can be used to leak users' private information. Such privacy threats are a major obstacle to the wide adoption of IoT applications, as demonstrated by prior studies [3] - [8] .
The bulk of previous work assumes independence between the traces of different users. We argue that this is not the case in practice, i.e., for many applications, there is dependencies between the traces of different users. For example, friends tend to travel together or might meet at given places, hence introducing dependencies between the traces of their location information. Several previous work [9] - [15] has considered cross-user correlation, however, only for protecting queries on aggregated data, which is different than our application scenario. Other previous work [16] - [19] have mostly considered temporal and spatial correlation within data traces, but not crossuser correlations. In [16] , an obfuscation technique is employed to achieve privacy; however, for continuous location-based services (LBS) queries, there is often strong temporal correlation in the locations. Hence, [16] considers how correlation of the users' obfuscated locations can impact location privacy, and then employs an adaptive noise level to achieve more privacy while still maintaining an acceptable level of utility. Liu et al. [18] show that the spatiotemporal correlation between neighboring location sets can ruin the privacy achieved using a dummybased location-privacy preserving mechanism (LPPM); to solve this problem, they propose a spatiotemporal correlation-aware privacy protection that perturbs the spatiotemporal correlation between neighboring locations. Zhang et al. [17] employed Protecting Location Privacy (PLP) against correlation-analysis attack in crowd sensing: the potential correlation between users' locations is modeled and the data is filtered to remove the samples that disclose the user's private locations. In [19] , locations of a single user are temporally correlated, and δ-location set based differential privacy is proposed to achieve location privacy at every timestamp. Finally, Song et al. [20] provide privacy when there is correlation within the data of a single user. In summary, previous studies do not consider dependency between users, which is the focus of this work.
We use the notion of "perfect privacy", as introduced in our prior work [21] , to evaluate privacy of user traces. The perfect privacy notion provides an information theoretic guarantee on privacy in the presence of a strong adversary who has complete knowledge on users' prior data traces.
Through a series of work [21] - [25] , we have derived the degree of user anonymization and data obfuscation required to obtain perfect privacy-assuming that the data traces of different users are independent across users. Particularly, we evaluated the case of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from a given user and the case when there is temporal correlation within the trace of a given user [22] , [23] (but independent across users). In this work, we expand our study to the case where there is dependency between the data traces of users. That is, we investigate the conditions needed to achieve perfect privacy using anonymization and obfuscation techniques in the presence of dependency between the data traces of users.
We model dependence between user traces with an association graph, where the presence of an edge between the vertices corresponding to a pair of users indicates a non-zero correlation between their data traces. We employ standard concentration inequalities to demonstrate that the adversary can readily determine this association graph. Using this association graph, the adversary can attempt to identify users, and we demonstrate that this provides the adversary with a significant advantage versus the case when the data traces of different users are independent of one another. This suggests that, unless additional countermeasures are employed, the results of [21] - [24] for independent traces are optimistic when user traces are correlated. We next consider the effectiveness of countermeasures. First, we demonstrate that adding independent obfuscation to user data samples is often ineffective in improving the privacy of (correlated) users. Next, we demonstrate that, if users with correlated traces can jointly design their obfuscation, user privacy can be significantly improved.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the model and metrics considered in this work. Section V derives the requirements for perfect privacy to be obtained in the case of correlation among users' data traces. We discuss countermeasures in Sections III and IV. Finally, Section VI presents the conclusions and ideas for continuing work.
A. Summary of the Results
Consider a network with n total users. As in our previous work [21] , privacy depends on two parameters: (1) m = m(n), the number of data points after which the pseudonyms of users are changed in the anonymization technique; and (2) a n , which indicates the amplitude of the obfuscation noise, i.e., larger a n implies higher levels of obfuscation.
When there are a large number of users in the network (n → ∞) and each user's dataset is governed by an i.i.d. process with r possible values for each data point (e.g., r possible locations), we obtain a no-privacy region in the m(n) − a n plane. Figure 1a shows the no-privacy region for the case when there exists inter-user correlation, and Figure 1b shows the no-privacy region when the users' traces are independent across users. As it is observed, there exists a larger no-privacy region where there exist inter-users correlation, therefore, we find that dependency between users weakens their privacy.
In addition, for the case where users' datasets are governed by an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chains with r states and |E | edges, we obtain the same results, again showing that inter-user correlation degrades user privacy.
II. FRAMEWORK
Here, we employ a similar framework to [21] , [23] . The system has n users, and X u (k) is user u's data at time k. Our main goal is protecting X u (k) from a strong adversary (A) who has full knowledge of the (unique) marginal probability distribution function of the data samples of each user based on previous observations or other sources. In order to achieve data privacy for users, both anonymization and obfuscation techniques can be used as shown in Figure 2 .
In Figure 2 , Z u (k) shows the (reported) sample of the data of user u at time k after applying obfuscation, and Y u (k) shows the (reported) sample of the data of user u at time k after applying anonymization. Let m = m(n) be the number of data points after which the pseudonyms of users are changed using anonymization. To break anonymization, the adversary tries to estimate X u (k), k = 1, 2, · · · , m, from m observations per user by matching the sequence of observations to the known statistical characteristics of the users. Let X u be the m × 1 vector containing the samples of the data of user u, and X be the m × n matrix with the u th column equal to X u :
. . .
Data Samples Model:
We assume users' data points can have one of r possible values (0, 1, · · · , r − 1). Thus, according to a user-specific probability distribution, X u (k) is equal to a value in {0, 1, · · · , r − 1} at any time, and, per above, these user-specific probability distributions are known to the adversary (A) and form the basis upon which she performs (statistical) matching.
Association Graph: An association graph or dependency graph is an undirected graph representing dependencies of the data of users with each other. Let G(V, F) denote the association graph with set of nodes V, (|V | = n), and set of edges F. Two vertices (users) are connected if their data sets are dependent. More specifically,
where I (X u (k); X u (k)) is the mutual information between the k th data sample of user u and user u . Note that, because we assume statistical stationarity in this paper, positive mutual information for one k means positive information for all k's.
Obfuscation Model: Obfuscation perturbs the users' data samples [26] - [28] . Normally, in such settings, each user has only limited knowledge of the characteristics of the overall population.
Thus, usually, a simple distributed method in which the samples of the data of each user are reported with error with a certain probability is employed [36] . Note that this probability itself is generated randomly for each user. Let Z u be the vector that contains the obfuscated version of user u's data samples, and Z be the collection of Z u for all users,
Here we define the asymptotic noise level for an obfuscation technique. Loosely speaking, the asymptotic noise level of obfuscation is the highest probable percentage of data points that are corrupted. More precisely, for a subset of users U, let X u (k) be the actual sample of the data of user u at time k, u ∈ U, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m} and let Z u (k) be the obfuscated (noisy) version of
Then, the asymptotic noise level for user u is defined as follows:
Also define
then the asymptotic noise level for the entire dataset is
Note that while the above definition is given for a general case required in Section V, in practice we often use simple obfuscation techniques that employ i.i.d. noise sequences. Then, by the Strong Law of Large Number (SLLN),
and for any k,
Anonymization Model: In the anonymization technique, the identity of the users is perturbed [2] , [29] - [35] . Anonymization is modeled by a random permutation Π on the set of n users. Let Y u be the vector which contains the anonymized version of Z u , and Y is the collection of Y u for all users, thus
where Perm( . , Π) is permutation operation with permutation function Π. As a result, Y u =
Adversary Model: We assume the adversary has full knowledge of the marginal probability distribution function of each of the users on {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}. As discussed in the data samples models in succeeding sections, the parameters p u , u = 1, 2, · · · , n are drawn independently from a continuous density function, f P (p u ), which has support on a subset of a given hypercube. The density f P (p u ) might be unknown to the adversary, so all that is assumed here is that such a density exists. From the results of the paper, it will be evident that knowing or not knowing f P (p u ) does not change the results asymptotically.
The adversary knows the anonymization mechanism but does not know the realization of the random permutation. The adversary also knows the obfuscation mechanism but does not know the realization of the noise parameters. And finally, the adversary knows the association graph G(V, F), but does not necessarily know the exact nature of the dependency. That is, while the adversary knows the marginal distributions X u (k) as well as which pairs of users have strictly positive mutual information, he might not know the joint distributions or even the values of the mutual information I(X u (k); X u (k)).
It is critical to note that the adversary does not have any auxiliary information or side information about users' data.
We adapt the definitions of perfect privacy and no privacy from [21] , [23] : 
Hence, a user has no privacy if there exists an algorithm for the adversary to estimate X u (k)
with diminishing error probability as n goes to infinity.
Discussion: Both of the privacy definitions given above (perfect privacy and no privacy) are asymptotic in the number of users (n → ∞), which allows us to find clean analytical results for the fundamental limits. Moreover, in many IoT applications, such as ride sharing and dining recommendation applications, the number of users is large.
Notation: Note that the sample of data of user u at time k after applying obfuscation (Z u (k)) and the sample of data of user u at time k after applying anonymization (Y u (k)) depend on the number of users in the setting (n), while the actual sample of data of user u at time k is independent of the number of users (n). Despite the dependency in the former cases, we omit this subscript (n) on Z (n) u (k), Y (n) u (k) to avoid confusion and make the notations consistent.
III. IMPACT OF CORRELATION ON PRIVACY USING ANONYMIZATION
In this section, we consider only anonymization and thus the obfuscation block in Figure 2 is not present. In this cases, the adversary's observation Y is the anonymized version of X; thus
A. i.i.d. Two-States Model
There is potentially dependency between the data of different users, but we assume here that the sequence of data for any individual user is i.i.d. We first consider the i.i.d. two-states (r = 2) case, where the sample of the data of user u at any time is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p u , which we define as the probability of user u being at state 1. Thus,
The parameters p u , u = 1, 2, · · · , n are drawn independently from a continuous density function, f P (p u ), on the (0, 1) interval. Further, we assume there are δ 1 , δ 2 > 0 such that 1 :
The adversary knows the values of p u , u = 1, 2, · · · , n, and uses this knowledge to match the observed traces to the users. We will use capital letters (i.e., P u ) when we are referring to the random variable, and use lower case (i.e., p u ) to refer to the realization of P u .
A vector containing the permutation of those probabilities after anonymization is
The condition δ 1 < f P (p u ) < δ 2 is not actually necessary for the results and can be relaxed; however, we keep it here to avoid unnecessary technicalities.
where V u = P Π −1 (u) and V Π(u) = P u . As a result, for u = 1, 2, ..., n, the distribution of the data symbols for the user with pseudonym u is given by:
In this case, dependency and correlation of the data samples are equivalent, that is, we can say:
where ρ uu is the correlation coefficient between the data of user u and that of user u . The adversary knows the association graph G(V, F), but does not necessarily know the correlation
Critical to compromising the privacy of the users will be the adversary's ability to match empirical correlation properties of the data traces to the known structure of the (ensemble) correlation between users. First, we show that the adversary can reliably reconstruct the entire association graph for the anonymized version of the data (i.e., the observed data traces) with relatively few observations. Proof. We provide an algorithm for the adversary that with high probability obtains all edges of F correctly. For each pair u and u , compute
where
Then:
We show the above method yields P( F = F) → 1 as n → ∞, as follows. Note
then by using the Chernoff bound, for any ζ > 0, we have
Similarly, define
Now, by using a union bound, we have
Then by employing a union bound again,
Thus, with high probability, for all u, u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, we have
As a result, by using (1),
Similarly,
For (u, u ) F, we have ρ uu = 0, and as a result, p uu − p u p u = 0. Thus, with high probability,
Then, as n → ∞,
Similarly, for (u, u ) ∈ F, we have ρ uu > 0, thus and as a result, as n → ∞,
Thus, for large enough n, we have P F = F → 1, so the adversary can reconstruct the association graph for the anonymized version of data with small error probability. Note that reconstruction of the association graph does not require the adversary's knowledge about user statistics (i.e., the values of p u 's).
The structure of the association graph (G) can leak a lot of information. For example, in Figure 3 , the identity map is the only automorphism of the association graph G. Thus, it is obvious that the adversary can uniquely identify all of the users if he/she can reconstruct the association graph G of the anonymized data.
To be able to derive further results, we need to make some assumptions on the structure of the association graph. For the rest of the paper, we consider a graph structure shown in Figure   4 , where the association graph consists of f disjoint subgraphs,
where subgraph G j is a connected graph on s j vertices. In particular, each subgraph G j can be thought of as a group of "friends" or "associates" such that their data sets are dependent. So,
Note that, we assume s j 's are finite.
The following theorem states that if the number of observations per user (m) is significantly larger than n 2 s in this two-states model, where s is the size of the group that the user belongs to, then the adversary can successfully de-anonymize the users in that group. then user 1 has no privacy for large enough n.
Discussion: It is insightful to compare this result to Theorem 1 in [21] , where it is stated that if the users are not correlated, then all users have perfect privacy as long as the number of adversary's observations per user (m) is smaller than O(n 2 ). Here, Theorem 1 states that with much smaller m the adversary can de-anonymize the users. Therefore, we see that dependency can significantly reduce the privacy of users.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 consists of three parts:
1) Showing the adversary can reconstruct the association graph of the anonymized version of data with small error probability.
2) Showing the adversary can uniquely identify group 1 with small error probability.
3) Showing the adversary can individually identify all the members within group 1.
For the first part of the proof, we use Lemma 1, which states the adversary can reconstruct the entire association graph with arbitrary small error probability if the number of the adversary's observations per user (m) is bigger than (log n) 3 . More specifically, since n 2 s > (log n) 3 , we can use Lemma 1, to conclude that the adversary can reconstruct the association graph with small error probability. Note that for the second and third part of the proof, we use m = n 2 s +α which is defined in the statement of Theorem 1.
Now, assume the size of group 1 is s. Without loss of generality, suppose the members of group 1 are users {1, 2, · · · , s}. Note that there are at most n s groups of size s. We call these groups 1, 2, · · · , n s . The adversary needs to first identify group 1 among all of these groups. First, for u = 1, 2, · · · , s, the adversary computes p u as follow:
as a result,
Define Σ s as the set of all permutations on s elements; for σ ∈ Σ s , σ : {1, 2, · · · , s} → {1, 2, · · · , s} is a one-to-one mapping.
Consider the L− infinity norm of the difference of these two sets:
and, for P (1) , P (1) ∈ R s :
Now, we claim for large enough n, Define the hypercubes of F (n) and H (n) as First, we prove
Thus, by applying the union bound, we have
as n → ∞. As a result, D P (1) , P (1) ≤ T n with high probability.
In the next step, we prove P n s j=2 D P (1) , P ( j) ≤ T n → 0. For all groups other than group
and as a result,
as n → ∞. Thus, all P ( j) 's are outside of H (n) with high probability.
Now, we prove that given all P ( j) 's are outside of H (n) , P n s j=2 D P (1) , P ( j) ≤ T n → 0. We show that P ( j) 's are close to P ( j) 's, and as a result, they will be outside of F (n) . Specifically, by using a Chernoff bound, for all u ∈ Group j, we have
thus, by applying a union bound, we have
Now by using a union bound, again, we have
as n → ∞. Thus, for all j = 2, 3, · · · , n s , P ( j) 's are close to P ( j) 's, thus they will be outside of F (n) . Now, we can conclude as n → ∞ that:
This means that with high probability all P ( j) are outside of F (n) , so the adversary can successfully identify group 1.
Finally, we prove that, after identifying group 1, the adversary can correctly identify each member. This step can be done using a similar approach to that above. We define two sets B (n) and C (n) ( Figure 6 ) around p 1 . We will show that with high probability, the true estimated value of p 1 (shown as p 1 ) is inside of B (n) . Also, all p u 's of other members of Group 1 are outside of C (n) , and since their estimated values are close to p u 's, the estimated values will be outside of B (n) . Therefore, the adversary can successfully invert the permutation Π within Group 1 and identify all of the members. Below are the details.
From (2) and (3), for u = 1, 2, · · · , s, we have
Now, according to Figure 6 , define
. Now, we claim that if m = cn 2 s +α for all members of group 1, as n → ∞,
Thus, the adversary can identify Π(1) by examining p u 's and choosing the only one that belongs to B (n) .
First, we want to show that as n goes to infinity,
From the Chernoff bound, as n → ∞,
As a result,
Now, we need to show that as n goes to infinity,
First, we define
and claim as n goes to infinity, thus, all p u 's are outside of C (n) for u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , s} with high probability.
Now, we claim that given all p u 's are outside of C (n) , P p Π(u) ∈ B (n) is small. Note,
According to the Chernoff bound,
As a result, by using a union bound, as n becomes large,
Thus, we have proved that if m = n 2 s +α , there exists an algorithm for the adversary to successfully recover all the members of group 1. Remember, the adversary identifies the members of group 1 independent of the structure of the subgraph.
B. i.i.d. r-States Model
Now, assume users' data samples can have r possibilities (0, 1, · · · , r − 1), and p u (i) is the probability of user u having the data value i, i.e., p u (i) = P(X u (k) = i), for k = 1, 2, · · · , m. We define the vector p u as
We also assume p u 's are drawn independently from some continuous density function, f P (p u ), which has support on a subset of the (0, 1) r−1 hypercube. In particular, define the range of the distribution as
Then, we assume there are δ 1 , δ 2 > 0 such that: then user 1 has no privacy for large enough n.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The algorithm for the adversary to identify all users is similar to Theorem 1. In the first part, we prove the adversary can successfully recover the association graph of anonymized data. Then we show the adversary can uniquely identify group 1 among all groups, and finally we show the adversary can correctly identify all of the members of group 1.
Here, we provide the general idea and focus on the main points instead of stating the whole proof.
First, we extend the definition of D (Φ, Ψ) for vectors. Let
where for u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s},
Now define
and we claim for large enough n,
This can be shown similar to the above proof that we provided for the two-states case. First define F (n) and H (n) as
then, prove the adversary can identify group 1 successfully. In the next step, the adversary has to identify each member of group 1 correctly. Let's define sets B (n) and C (n) as
. Figure 7 shows p 1 , sets B (n) and C (n) in range of R P for case r = 3. We claim for m = cn as n → ∞; thus, user 1 has no privacy.
C. Markov Chain Model
In Sections III-A and III-B, we assumed each user's data patterns was i.i.d.. In this section, users' data patterns are modeled using Markov chains in which each user's data samples are dependent over time. In this model, we again assume there are r possibilities for each data point, i.e., X u (k) ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}.
More specifically, each user's data is modeled by a Markov chain with r states. It is assumed that the Markov chains of all users have the same structure but have different transition probabilities. Let E be the set of edges in the assumed transition graph, so (i, l) ∈ E if there exists an edge from state i to state l, meaning that p u (i, l) = P (X u (k + 1) = l |X u (k) = i) > 0. The transition matrix is a square matrix used to describe the transitions of a Markov chain; thus, different users can have different transition probability matrices. Note for each state i, we have r l=1 p u (i, l) = 1, so the adversary can focus on a subset of size d = |E | − r of the transition probabilities for recovering the entire transition matrix. Let p u be the vector that contains these transition probabilities for user u. We write
We also consider p u (i)'s are drawn independently from some continuous density function, f P (p u ), on the (0, 1) |E |−r hypercube. Define the range of distribution as
As before, we assume there are δ 1 , δ 2 > 0, such that
Now, we can repeat the same steps as the previous sections to prove the following theorem. then user 1 has no privacy for large enough n.
The basic ideas behind the proof of Theorem 3 are similar to the ones for Theorems 1 and 2; thus, in this part we just focus on the differences and key ideas.
Define the random variable M u (i) as the total number of visits by user u to state i, for u = 1, 2, · · · , n and i = 0, 1, · · · , r − 1. Since the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, and m → ∞, all M i (u) m converge to their stationary values. Given M u (i) = m u (i), the transitions from state i to state l for user u has a multinomial distribution with probabilities p u (i, l). Now, considering the fact that the vector p u uniquely determines the user u, the adversary can invert the anonymization permutation function in a similar way to the i.i.d. case by focusing on
Now define
This can be shown similar to the proof of Theorem 1. First define F (n) and H (n) as
then, prove that the adversary can identify group 1 successfully. In the next step, the adversary has to identify each member of group 1 correctly. Define sets B (n) and C (n) as
We claim for m = cn 2 s( |E |−r) +α ,
as n → ∞. This can be shown similar to the proof of Theorem 1, so the adversary can successfully recover the members of group 1.
IV. PRIVACY USING ANONYMIZATION AND OBFUSCATION
Here we consider the case when both anonymization and obfuscation techniques are employed, as shown in Figure 2 . We assume similar obfuscation to [23] .
A. i.i.d. Two-States Model
Again, let us start with the i.i.d. two-states model. As before, we assume that p u 's are drawn independently from some continuous density function, f P (p u ), on the (0, 1) interval.
To obfuscate the data samples, for each user u we independently generate a random variable R u that is uniformly distributed between 0 and a n , where a n ∈ (0, 1]. The value of R u shows the probability that the user's data sample is changed to a different value by obfuscation, and a n is termed the "noise level" of the system. So, for the case of r = 2, where there are two states for users' data pattern (state 0 and state 1), the obfuscated data is obtained by passing users' data through a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with small error probability [36] , so we can write
The effect of the obfuscation is to alter the probability distribution function of each user's data samples in a way that is unknown to the adversary, since it is independent of all past activity of the user, and hence the obfuscation inhibits user identification. For each user, R u is generated once and is kept constant for the collection of samples of length m, thus providing a very low-weight obfuscation algorithm.
The Z u (k)'s are i.i.d. with a Bernoulli distribution with parameter
Thus,
Here, q u is the probability that an obfuscated data sample of user u is equal to one. Define the vector Q that contains the obfuscated probabilities:
and the vector containing the permutation of those probabilities after anonymization as V. So
As a result, for u = 1, 2, ..., n, • R u ∼ Uni f orm[0, a n ], where a n c n −( 1 s +β) for any c > 0 and β > α 4 ; then user 1 has no privacy as n goes to infinity.
Discussion: It is insightful to compare this result to Theorem 1 in [23] , which states that if the users are not correlated, then all users have perfect privacy as long the noise level (a n ) used to obfuscate the users' data samples is larger than O(n −1 ), even if m(n) is arbitrary. Here, Theorem 4 states that with a much larger a n the adversary can de-anonymize and de-obfuscate all users with vanishing error probability. Therefore, we see that correlation can significantly reduce the privacy of users. However, note that the asymptotic noise level is still zero in this
implying that the asymptotic noise level is zero.
Proof of Theorem 4 :
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and consists of three parts:
1) Showing the adversary can reconstruct the association graph of the obfuscated and anonymized data with small error probability.
3) Showing the adversary can successfully identify all of the members of group 1.
In Lemma 1, we show that for the case of anonymization, the adversary can reconstruct the entire association graph with arbitrarily small error probability if the number of the adversary's observations per user (m) is bigger than (log n) 3 . Since obfuscation is done independently (from other users' obfuscation and from users' data), it does not change the association graph.
Therefore, since n 2 s +α > (log n) 3 , we can use Lemma 1 to show the adversary can reconstruct the obfuscated version of association graph with small error probability. Now, assume the size of group 1 is s. Without loss of generality, suppose the members of group 1 are users {1, 2, · · · , s}, so there are at most n s groups of size s. We call these groups 1, 2, · · · , n s . The adversary needs to first identify the group 1 among all of these groups. According to Section III-A, Σ s is defined as the set of all permutation on s elements, and P (1) , P (1) ∈ R s are defined as
We claim as n → ∞ that:
As shown in Figure 6 , define
First we prove, for large enough n, that P D P (1) , P (1) ≤ T n → 1.
Note
where M u = |{k : Z u (k) = 1}|.
Now can write for all u in Group 1,
Note that for any u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s}, we have
so, we can conclude
≥ P −T n + a n ≤ M u m − q u ≤ −a n + T n = P M u − mq u ≤ m(T n − a n ) .
Since a n → 0, for p u ∈ (0, 1) and large enough n, we can say p u + a n < 2p u . Employing a Chernoff bound,
Now from (8) and (9), we can conclude
Recall D P (1) ,
thus, by using the definition of D P (1) , P (1) and Equation 10 and applying the union bound, we have
as n → ∞. As a result,
In the next step, we should prove P n s j=2 D P (1) , P ( j) ≤ T n → 0.
First, we prove and claim that, as n goes to infinity, P n s j=2 P ( j) ∈ H (n) → 0.
and as a result, as n → ∞. As a result, we can conclude that all P ( j) 's are outside of H (n) for j ∈ 2, 3, · · · , n s with high probability.
Now, we claim that, given all P ( j) 's are outside of H (n) , P n s j=2 D P (1) , P ( j) ≤ T n is small.
In other words, by using a Chernoff bound, it is shown P ( j) 's are close to P ( j) 's, and they will be outside of F (n) .
For all u in Group j,
Remember that for any u in Group j, we have |p u − q u | ≤ a n , so, we have
Note a n → 0, so for p u ∈ (0, 1) and large enough n, we have p u + a n < 2p u . Now, by using a Chernoff Bound,
Thus, by applying a union bound we can conclude
Now by using a union bound, we can conclude,
as n → ∞. Thus, we have shown that for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n s , P ( j) 's are close to P ( j) , which are outside of set F (n) . As a result, as n → ∞, P n s j=2 D P (1) , P ( j) ≥ T n → 1.
In the next step, we need to prove that after identifying group 1, the adversary can correctly identify each member. In other words, the adversary should identify the permutation of group 1.
According to Figure 6 , we define
, and we claim that if m = cn 2 s +α for all members of group 1,
First, we show that as n goes to infinity,
we can write
So, we can conclude
Since a n → 0, for p 1 ∈ (0, 1) and large enough n, we can say p 1 + a n < 2p 1 . According to a Chernoff bound,
Now by using (11) and (12), we can conclude ,
Now, we need to show that as n goes to infinity, P s u=2 p Π(u) ∈ B (n) → 0.
and claim as n goes to infinity, P s u=2 P u ∈ C (n) → 0.
Note 4∆ n δ 1 ≤ P P u ∈ C (n) ≤ 4∆ n δ 2 , and according to the union bound,
as n → ∞. As a result, we can conclude that all p j 's are outside of C (n) for u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n} with high probability. Now, we claim that given all p u 's are outside of C (n) , P p Π(u) ∈ B (n) is small. Remember that for any u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, we have |p u − q u | ≤ a n . Now, we can write P p Π(u) ∈ B (n) ≤ P p Π(u) − q u ≥ (∆ n − a n ) = P M u − mq u ≥ m(∆ n − a n ) .
According to the Chernoff bound, for large enough n,
From (13) and (14), we have
Thus, by using a union bound, we can conclude,
as n → ∞. So the adversary can successfully recover Z 1 (k). Since Z 1 (k) = X 1 (k) with probability
, the adversary can recover X 1 (k) with vanishing error probability.
B. i.i.d. r-States Model
Now, assume users' data samples can have r possibilities (0, 1, · · · , r − 1). Similar to Section III-B, we assume p u 's are drawn independently from some continuous density function, f P (p u ), which has support on a subset of the (0, 1) r−1 hypercube, and p u , f P (p u ), and R P are defined as in Section III-B.
Also, for the case r > 2, the obfuscated data is obtained by passing the users' data through an r-ary symmetric channel with a random error probability, so for l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}: • R u ∼ Uni f orm[0, a n ], where a n c n − 1 s(r−1) +β for any c > 0 and β > α 4 ; user 1 has no privacy as n goes to infinity.
By using the general idea stated in Section III-B, the proof of Theorem 5 is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.
C. Markov Chain Model
In this section, users' data patterns are modeled using Markov chains and there are r possibilities for users' data patterns. Similar to Section III-C, we assume p u (i)'s are drawn independently from some continuous density function, f P (p u ), on the (0, 1) |E |−r hypercube, and p u , f P (p u ), and R P are defined in Section III-C.
Using the above observations, we can now repeat the same reasoning as the last sections to show the following theorem. • R u ∼ Uni f orm[0, a n ], where a n c n − 1 s( |E |−r) +β for any c > 0 and β > α 4 ; then user 1 has no privacy for large enough n.
V. ACHIEVING PERFECT PRIVACY IN THE PRESENCE OF CORRELATION
In the previous parts of the paper, we argued and demonstrated that dependencies between users can degrade the privacy provided by standard privacy-preserving mechanisms (PPMs). In this section, we discuss how to design PPMs considering user dependencies in order to better preserve privacy. First, note that independent obfuscation alone cannot be sufficient even at a high noise level, because it cannot change the association graph. Therefore, the adversary can still reconstruct the association graph with a small number of observations if we add independent obfuscation noise. To mitigate this issue, we suggest that associated users should collaborate in applying the noise when deploying a PPM.
For clarity, we focus on the two-states i.i.d. case (r = 2) where the association graph consists of subgraphs with the size of each of them less than or equal to 2 (s j ≤ 2). Thus, according to Figure 8 , there are some connected users and there are also some isolated users. First, we state the following lemma. Lemma 2. Let X 1 (k) ∼ Bernouli(p 1 ) and X 2 (k) ∼ Bernouli(p 2 ); then, there exists an obfuscated technique with an asymptotic noise level
for the dataset of user 1 and user 2 such that Z 1 (k) and Z 2 (k) are independent from each other.
Proof. We explain the idea behind this lemma by an example.
Example 1. Let X 1 (k) ∼ Bernouli 3 5 and X 2 (k) ∼ Bernouli 1 5 , and let Table I show the joint probability mass function of X 1 (k) and X 2 (k). As a result, if we observe 2000 bits of data, Table II shows the expected results according to   Table I . Then, to make Z 1 (k) and Z 2 (k) independent, it is sufficient for Z 1 (k)|Z 2 (k) = 0 to have the same distribution as Z 1 (k)|Z 2 (k) = 1. This means we should have
thus, according to Table III , we should have It is easy to check that the asymptotic noise level will be given by the equation in the lemma.
Specifically, for the above example,
, and we have
Now, to prove the lemma, apply the above procedure to a general table for a probability mass function. Let X 1 (k) ∼ Bernouli (p 1 ) and X 2 (k) ∼ Bernouli (p 2 ). Then, to make this two sequences independent, it suffices if Z 1 |Z 2 = 0 has same distributions as Z 1 (k)|Z 2 (k) = 1. We only prove for the case max{p 1 , p 2 , 1 − p 1 , 1 − p 2 } = 1 − p 2 , and the proofs of the other cases are similar to this one. Now, to make Z 1 (k) and Z 2 (k) independent, we will change Υ × N data points: If X 1 (k) = 1 and X 2 (k) = 1, we pass X 1 (k) through a BSC(Υ) in order to obtain Z 1 (k). Thus,
so Υ can be calculated as
.
Now we can conclude,
AsymptoticNoise level = Υ · P (X 1 (k) = 1, X 2 (k) = 1)
Lemma 2 provides a method to convert correlated data to independent traces. The remaining task is to show that we achieve perfect privacy after applying such a method. Consider G(V, F), where s j ≤ 2. We have the same model for p u as in previous sections: p u is chosen from some density f P (p) such that, for δ 1 , δ 2 > 0:
Also if (u, u ) ∈ F, ρ uu is chosen according to some density f P(ρ uu |p u ,p u ) with range of 0, min
. The following theorem states that we can indeed achieve perfect privacy if we allow collaboration between users.
Theorem 7. For the two-states model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, Y is the anonymized version of Z, and the size of all subgraphs are less than 2, there exist an anonymization/obfuscation scheme such that for all (u, u ) ∈ F, the asymptotic noise level for users u and u is at most a e (u, u ) = |Cov(X u (k), X u (k))| max{p u , p u , 1 − p u , 1 − p u } , to achieve perfect privacy for all users. The anonymization parameter m = m(n) can be made arbitrarily large.
Proof. There are two main steps.
Step 1: De-correlate based on Lemma 2. In particular, note that for at least half of the users, no noise is added in this step. More specifically, define U = Set of unaffected users = {u : no noise is added to user u in this step}.
Then after step 1, we have Z u (k) ∼ Bernouli(q u ). As a result,
• For u ∈ U; Z u (k) = X u (k) and q u = p u .
• For u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} − U; Z u (k) X u (k) and q u p u .
Note |U| ≥ n 2 , because the main graph consists of some subgraphs with s j ≤ 2.
Step 2: Assume q u 's are known to the adversary. The set up is now very similar to Theorem 1 in [23] , where perfect privacy is proved for the i.i.d. data. But there is a difference here.
Specifically, although the users' data Z u (k) are now independent, the distribution of q u 's are not, since they are the result of the data-dependent obfuscation technique of Lemma 2. Luckily, this issue can be easily resolved, so that we can show perfect privacy for user 1. The main idea is to use the fact that as stated above, at least n 2 of the users are not impacted by the de-correlation step. As we see below, these users will be sufficient to ensure perfect privacy for user 1 (which may or may not be in the set U).
Let's explore the distributions of Q u = q u for users in the set U. For any correlated pair of users, the method of Lemma 2 leaves the one whose p u is farthest from 1 2 intact. Since p u 's are chosen independently from each other and each user is correlated with only one user, it is easy to see that for users in the set U, the Q u 's are i.i.d. with the following probability density function f Q (q ) = 2 f P (q ) ∫ max(q ,1−q ) min(q ,1−q ) f P (x)dx.
Therefore, the setup is the same as Theorem 1 in [23] where we want to prove perfect privacy for user 1, and we have n 2 users who are independent from user 1 and their parameter q u is chosen i.i.d. according to a density function. However, there is a small problem. We need to check that the density function f Q (q ) satisfies the condition δ 1 < f Q (q ) < δ 2 for some δ 1 and δ 2 on a neighborhood q ∈ [p 1 − , p 1 + ]. First, note that f Q (q ) = 2 f P (q )
Next,
Thus, as long as p 1 1 2 , the condition is satisfied 2 . Therefore, we can show perfect privacy for user 1. Note that here, in the second step we need to apply a second stage of obfuscation and apply anonymization according to Theorem 1 in [23] . Nevertheless, since the noise level a n → 0 for this second stage, the asymptotic noise level will stay the same as that for step 1, i.e. |Cov(X u (k), X u (k))| max{p u , p u , 1 − p u , 1 − p u } . Now, the above method can be extended to the case where s j > 2. Let s j = 3. From Figure   9 , there are three different situations in this case: 1) Case 1: As shown in Figure 9a , only user 1 and user 2 are correlated to each other, so we de-correlate them based on Lemma 2. Then, Theorem 7 will be applied to achieve perfect privacy for them.
2) Case 2: As shown in Figure 9b , user 1 and user 2 are correlated, and user 2 and user 3 are correlated. In the first step, we de-correlate user 2 and user 3 based on Lemma 2. Now, we face a similar situation as that in case 1. Hence, we can make all of the users independent from each other and then according to Theorem 7, we can achieve perfect privacy for all of them. 2 The case p 1 = 1 2 has zero probability, and thus need not be considered. Nevertheless, the result can be shown for p 1 = 1 2 , as all we require is a number of users proportional to the length of the interval in the vicinity of p 1 .
(a) Case 1.
(b) Case 2.
(c) Case 3. Fig. 9 : Three different ways which 3 users can be correlated to each other.
3) Case 3: As shown in Figure 9c , all three users are correlated to each other. In the first step, we use Lemma 2 to make user 1 and user 3 uncorrelated. Now, we have a similar situation as case 2, so we can make all the users independent from each other and then, according to Theorem 7, we can achieve perfect privacy for all of them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Resourceful adversaries can leverage statistical matching based on the prior behavior of users in order to break the privacy provided by PPMs. Our previous work has considered the requirements on anonymization and obfuscation for "perfect" user privacy to be maintained when traces are independent between users. However, in practice users show correlated data traces, as relationships between users establish dependence in their behavior. In this paper, we demonstrated that such dependencies degrade the privacy of PPMs, as the anonymization employed must be significantly increased to preserve perfect privacy, and often no degree of independent obfuscation of the traces can be effective. We also present preliminary results on dependent obfuscation to preserve user privacy.
